Kevin Hoffberg

The Madness of Afghanistan and a Little Trick I Call Math

by kevin on July 1, 2010

For the past decade I have made a living helping people and corporations make smarter decisions.  I say that by way of disclosing my bias when I think about nearly everything.  Yesterday I blogged about General Petraeus’ testimony before the Armed Services Committee in advance of his taking over as the overlord of the “not war” in Afghanistan.  You should read it.  It is a marvel of circumlocution.

Good decision making begins with an exam question: The entire rationale for making a decision in the first place; a statement of the problem we’re trying to solve. Use your favorite search engine and see if you can figure out the answer to the question of why we’re in Afghanistan. I figure the President’s own words from his State of the Union are as good as any . . .

As we take the fight to al Qaeda, we are responsibly leaving Iraq to its people. As a candidate, I promised that I would end this war, and that is what I am doing as President. We will have all of our combat troops out of Iraq by the end of this August. We will support the Iraqi government as they hold elections, and continue to partner with the Iraqi people to promote regional peace and prosperity. But make no mistake: this war is ending, and all of our troops are coming home.

So basically the point is to “take the fight to al Qaeda” or more broadly to “fight terror over there so we don’t have to fight it here” or something like that.  I’m sure that there are more precise thoughts than that but basically that’s the mission the American people have been sold for the past eight years by two different administrations.

There are lots of ways to think about this, so let’s pick one: The Math

From the State Department, here’s what we know about Afghanistan:

Area: 652,230 sq. km. (251,827 sq. mi.); slightly smaller than Texas.

Population (July 2009 est.): 28.396 million; slightly smaller than Texas.

GDP (2009 est., purchasing power parity): $23.35 billion.

GDP growth (2009 est.): 3.4%. GDP growth average between 2004-2009: 11.25% (est.).

GDP per capita (2009 est.): $800.

Keep in mind that GDP has been inflated by the US presence since we tossed the Taliban.

So how much have we spent to date on the “not war” in Afghanistan.  That’s a moving target, but here are some numbers that might help you understand. According to the site, Cost of War, the number to date (depending on when you read this) is $280 billion dollars. Add in the cost of the Iraq “not war” and we the people have spent about $1 trillion dollars “taking the fight to al Qaeda.”  To get a sense of some alternative uses of $1 trillion dollars, spend some time on the Cost of War site.

Keep in mind that these numbers don’t include the costs associated with the Obama surge of an additional 30,000 troops.  So what do those cost? One source I found put the figure in 2008 at $500,000 per year.  A more recent source puts the figure much higher.

The cost of sending one U.S. soldier in Afghanistan for one year is $1 million versus an estimated $12,000 for an Afghani soldier, according to Steve Daggett, a specialist with the Congressional Research Service. Those numbers fall within the calculations that the Obama administration has been using. The Obama administration is calculating $1 billion per 1,000 troops deployed to Afghanistan.

To put the cost of the surge in a different light, US tax payers will spend the entire GDP of Afghanistan to send 30,000 troops there to achieve what?

And how much does it cost the Taliban / Al Queda to fight back? It’s hard to put a number on that but a simple metric might be the cost of an AK-47.  It turns out that fighting Americans is a growth business.  A few years ago you could get a locally made knock-off for the equivalent of a few hundred dollars . . . so half a year’s pay.  Today, the price in Pakistan has bloomed to nearly $1,500. Throw in some ammunition and a year’s pay and call it $3,000 per annum, half that if you assume the person holding the gun is a variable cost.

This is the time when you need to stop and think about the mission and the math: $1 million vs. $3,000.  One bullet kills either one.

We have been in Afghanistan eight years.  Every year, on average, we spend the entire GDP of Afghanistan chasing after a couple of thousand bad guys that can be equipped and paid for less than one of our soldiers.

The war is unwinable for three reasons, all math related.

  1. It only takes one bad guy to do the thing we have spent $1 trillion dollars to prevent: commit a terrorist act on the homeland.  Call it 100.
  2. The other side can replace them faster and cheaper than we can kill them.
  3. We’re going broke.  The other side can wait.

The problem here is the problem statement. It’s like the war on drugs.  ”Taking the fight” to the bad guys never ends.  There is no end zone. There is no way of knowing that you’re winning.  More importantly, the cost of the other side to stay in the game is orders of magnitude lower than what we spend. The other side ALWAYS WINS for the simple reason that all they have to do is stay in the game.  Eventually the high cost player is bled dry. The only way out is to change the question.

Finally, a reminder.  The people voting to keep us in this mess work for us.  You voted for them (or failed to). It’s time to speak up.  It’s time to stop the madness.

{ 2 comments… read them below or add one }

Marv August 13, 2010 at 8:16 pm

Sorry I’m a little late on this comment. Around 1940, the Marines published a manual on how to fight and win small wars based on their 1930′s experiences in Central America. I wonder if anyone in our government today has ever read it. It spells out very specifically what you have to do to fight an insurgency and be successful: Prevent the insurgents from getting outside aid or safe havens, encourage local governance in which the population can have faith, build a local military and a police force that has the confidence of the people, provide only support and advice; the locals do the fighting. If the population doesn’t have the faith or interest in winning, no outside force of arms will substitute. We knew all this in the ’30s and we seem to have forgotten those lessons. We will not win in Afghanistan unless those conditions are met.

kevin August 13, 2010 at 9:11 pm

Brilliant. Can you point me to the manual?

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